**Links to**: [[001 Introduction to the Poltergeist]], [[000 Question]], [[000 Postulate]], [[Anticontinuous]], [[Bibliography]], [[Hierarchies of fields of investigation]], [[Logopatía]], [[Neologistics]]. The _raison d’être_ of this project is that we^[This project deals with the intricacies of language to a high degree of self-reference. [[Self-reference]] is assumed to be unavoidable and complex. The “we” that speaks in this text is language itself as mediator. Following proposals of dialogism—as a matter of fact extending beyond the humanities, see also: [[000 Problems]]—it is assumed throughout this entire project that, despite the individualist nature of the PhD game, natural language is evidence to the distributed, social nature of thought. This is why we speak from the first-person plural, though it would be more appropriately-termed _no-person plural_, or just _plural_. This is treated in [[002 Semantic noise]]. Alternatives to pronouns, and related challenges, are explored in [[Pronoun]].] do not know what **intelligence**^[Intelligence will be the catch-all concept used throughout, primarily because we are dealing with “AI” as our object of study. Other words such as _thought, reason, cognition, understanding, knowing, learning_, will be employed as well, but bear in mind that “intelligence” will be used to imply all these notions. Whenever other concepts appear, it will be explained why they appear as such. In general, we follow the observation by Matteo Pasquinelli that “older concerns of the relation between technology and reason re-emerge today as concerns of the relation between computation and cognition.” (2015, p. 8). Preemptively, it can already be mentioned that: a) “reason” will be used in the context of philosophy-specific parlance, where it is often contrasted with “understanding”, following Kant. These two categories are not opposed, however: _reason_ is that which supervenes over _understanding_, which tends to finite, temporary assessments, while reason is infinite as it must be fundamentally “open” and renewable. b) _Cognition_ will be used primarily in the context of cognitive science, and _thought_ will be used in the context of philosophy but also psychoanalysis, mostly in reference to “armchair” activities, such as remembering your youth or doing math in your head. c) _Knowing_ and _learning_ are both used to refer to phenomena of cognition/intelligence/thought/etc., such as in the first sentence of this text: “knowing” what intelligence is would imply cognizing/thinking/reasoning/etc. about intelligence.] is, yet “it” is conceptually ubiquitous: from IQ tests and AI, to natural selection and the politics and projections of longtermism. Knowing what something is—i.e., having a [[Model]] of it: i.e., knowing things that can be done with its [[pattern]]—has the technical, speculative and generally entertaining advantage that novelty can be generated atop of the old. Classically referred to as “seeing as” (Kantian “as if”, Dewey/Sellars’ “seeing as”, Wittgensteinian _aspect perception_, or Gibsonian _affordances_, to name a few comparable proposals),^[Comparable because they are not the same proposal: _seeing as_ is not strictly the same as _acting as if_, but in our proposal, in “high” abstraction: they are. The abstract characteristic joining them is that of _abstraction_ itself, which is to say: a conceptual structure can be discerned beyond their practical ramifications, which can be schematically derived/applied and observed across a variety of experiences. In this case, then: the capacity to _see as_ conforms with the logic of _as if_, given they both share the conceptual structure of comparing and/or replacing one experience for another.] experiencing a sense of _distance_ from something by not being subject *to* the experience but understanding the experience _as_ experience, has the advantage that we may modulate its contingency (see: [[prediction]]), rather than be subject to it.^[Though these two are not mutually opposed, this is explored in [[001.1 The Poltergeist in the Machine/C is for Communism, and for Constraint|C is for Communism, and for Constraint]].] The “most obvious” places where this is explored are philosophy (including mathematics, or vice versa), cognitive science and AI. This will not be argued, but assumed, throughout everything that is proposed hereon. A lot of the terminology in this project will be explained at the right place, in due time. But before muddling things it would be convenient to set up a brief lexicon in order not to confuse a possible reader, as this project is highly eclectic: it takes risks by merging many areas of knowledge and experimenting with language (sometimes to an annoying, but always amusing, degree).^[One of the project’s goals, after all, is that of [[Language-modulating]], so this cannot be avoided.] Since _intelligence_ is what we are after, and we have already presumed that it is currently unexplainable, let’s begin with aforementioned concepts that we think can be delineated to a degree of accuracy amenable to this project’s needs. These concepts, presented as follows, are central tempering elements of all the arguments/proposals explored in the project. **[[Philosophy]]**: the realm of abstract thought. Abstract both in the sense of abandonist^[Think the _armchair_, again. See also: _abstrahere_.] and in the sense of something which, after much ado, results in conceptual X-rays,^[Jameson calls the schematism, in Kant, “the X-ray of a concept” (2023, p. 31). We take from this metaphor the reductive yet functional image of the X-ray as that which reveals an underlying, general structure behind something more dynamic and fleshy.] that is: in the assigning of names to presumed patterns which apply at different spatiotemporal scales (e.g., the concept of “linearity” or, relatedly: “history”). Interference between scales is perhaps the most salient aspect of philosophical disagreement. Philosophy, for our purposes, includes aesthetics and mathematics. It includes aesthetics—in a Nietzschean fashion: _all_ is aesthetics, and eventually all aesthetics is (in)digestion—because the relentless _metabol_ precedes and processes the conditions of thought, as it seems we, creatures, sense before we think. The two are inseparable (phenomenology at large, 5E cognition, but even thinkers like Searle, all said this much). It includes mathematics, as mathematics deals with the possible shapes of language(s): it deals with the most abstract structures that can be made spatiotemporally durable. _All language is philosophy_, whether those who hate philosophy realize it or not. All words bottom-out at self-reference and/or unprovable ontological commitments, therefore, language’s philosophical excess cannot be denied nor avoided. **Cognitive science**: deals with philosophy in the flesh, and emerges from a (often war-driven) technico-medicinal impetus. **AI**: deals with philosophy outside the flesh, and emerges from a war-driven, capitalist-technical impetus. **Model**: the X-ray-like pattern in the practices named above (all practices are modelling practices) that becomes dynamically workable and, sometimes, applicable. E.g., we may observe the periodicity of the planets as a pattern, which can lead us to models such as the Ptolemaic or Copernican versions of the Solar system. Or: we may observe the pattern that is a plant resisting the seasons, leading to the modelling of aspects of plant nutrition such as photosynthesis. Note: concepts can be thought of as (sometimes rigid, sometimes loose) models. More on this in: [[concept]], [[Model]], [[pattern]]. **Pattern**: the central conceptual commitment of this project. Can sometimes be thought of as shadowing the concept of _information_, but this project prefers _pattern_ as it seems to unmuddle the field, while information is a highly contested notion with many definitions across many areas (see also: [[information]], [[thermodynamics]], [[cybernetics]], [[information theory]], [[computability]]). A pattern can be defined as a _repetition of differences_. **Difference**: the unavoidable starting point of anything, i.e., where the quality of any pattern, as pattern, begins (though we also need to think of _equivalence_ here, which enables repetition, more on this in [[equivalence]]). Perceptual-conceptual salience _is_ difference, and vice versa, and anything repeatedly/ably salient is what makes a pattern (see also: [[Difference]], [[different-ciation]], [[Equivalence and difference]]). **Equivalence**: where the notion of difference bottoms out. But also, relationally: difference is the notion where equivalence bottoms out. Both concepts are complementary and cannot be separated. Note: we opt for equivalence over identity, this is explained in [[Equivalence and difference]]. **Prediction**: the basic [[pattern]]al activity we observe across all regimes of sense/thought/modelling/etc. which allows for the sensing/thinking/modelling/etc. of salience (i.e. difference/equivalence interplay). Salience is whatever is attended to/matters at that moment. Prediction guarantees the ontology of patterns. It is very important to note that, despite all the criticisms it has seen as a concept (and rightly so in many domains which aspire to domination by way of pre-scription), prediction **does not imply providence or determinism**. Prediction is what allows for this text to be read, it permeates all action-perception-cognition and is an unavoidable feature of _life_ (see also: [[prediction]], [[free energy principle]]). These concepts are briefly delineated here but can be further explored in the respective entries: [[Philosophy]], [[Cognitive science]], [[AI]], [[Model]], [[Pattern]], [[Difference]], [[Equivalence]], [[Prediction]]. Please bear in mind that presenting the history of these concepts is the same/just as important as presenting their semantic-conceptual structure (as according to this project’s perspective/filtering). Therefore: both approaches will be mixed, sometimes implying the Carnapian difference between explication and explanation (_Meaning and Necessity_, 1947), where explanation draws out the _why_, the history, while explication delineates the specific contours of a concept’s structure and its (logical or “rational”) implications. We are not married to this idea but find it useful in the context of the interplay between pattern and model: explication is a positivist-constructivist proposal, it aims to define how a concept is constructed, in other words: how its pattern can be put to work. If the “work” metaphor does not sit nicely, please understand it broadly: as implying that something can move, transform, become, etc. While Carnap sought a certain forma/ulistic closure with the concept of explication, we would like to present it _inexactly_ here in order to allow for the emergence of new concepts, which is something Carnap also wanted (although in his proposal there is an incremental architecture one should aim to construct, rather than a house of flying cards. We are not sure where we stand here).^[Please note, the entire project is littered with these kinds of jokes. Take it or take it, humor is all.] ### Formality Also, in the spirit of relaxation, if one could imagine the formality of most finished theses as a celebratory dinner at a restaurant with thick napkins, resentful waiters and terrible acoustics, then this is should be cold pizza at your friend’s place. Hopefully. If the above seems satisfactory enough, please continue reading at: [[001 Introduction to the Poltergeist]]. PS: I am also very sorry if, in the future, any of the concepts/methods in this work become co-opted by antisocial assholes. This work is highly social and means no harm. I am equally sorry if I am unaware of using things that may make people think this is a work of bad magic, in bad faith. It is not. ### Footnotes