**Links to**: [[04 Concepts as pre-dictions]], [[Semantic attractor]], [[Pattern]], [[Reference]], [[Philosophy]], [[Misosophy]], [[Metaphor]], [[Analogy]], [[Intuition]], [[Cognition]], [[Logic]], [[Invention]], [[Real abstraction]], [[Real and imaginary]], [[Virtual]], etc. %% deleuze and guattari distinction between thought and concept maybe also do between tired and exhaustion, to show the prediction at play Deleuze quote the concept is the event, Badiou text on this %% ### [[Question]]: What is a concept and what does it do? ### [[Postulate]]: A concept in the flesh is a _pre-diction_. Dislodging it from the flesh, it can be understood as a trans-spatiotemporal effect (i.e., functioning across materials and modalities, see also: [[Semantic attractor]]), a mediating and modulating structure which most often reveals a concatenated pattern, but the logic it follows is indeterminate (always subject to change, whether it follows a random walk, an “clear and distinct” schema, or a combination of both). %% Where is the concept reza notes #todo Davidson, Donald. 1974. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Davidson 1984. Deleuze concept + event / Badiou %% > A concept being given, we can always seek the drama, and _the concept would never divide or specify itself_ in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms which determine it in this way in a material system beneath all possible representation. Take the concept of truth: it is not enough to ask the abstract question “what is the true?”. Once we ask “who wants the truth, when and where, how and how much?”, our task is to assign larval subjects (the jealous person, for example), and pure spatio-temporal dynamisms (either to make the “thing” emerge in person, at a certain time, in a certain place; or to accumulate clues and signs, from moment to moment and following an endless path). > > Deleuze 1967, pp. 95-6. ### Conceptual conditions What is a concept? A concept is an abstraction. What is an abstraction? An abstraction is a suspension of differences so that a particular salience can be brought into attention. What is attention? Attention is the directing of phenomenal experience towards something/salience. What is salience? That which appears as relevant during a given moment. What is relevant? That which is guided by preferences. What are preferences? These can be understood as physiological givens, habits, patterns which an agent returns to because it maintains itself within certain boundaries in order to remain what it is. All of these things can be understood under the FEP, giving shape to particular generative models. Where is a concept? What is it? One of the most basic concepts, a structure which underlies perhaps all of them, is that of _reference_. Pointing. Indexing. Without two or more minds, this type of dialogical reference is meaningless. One could argue that one-mind-referencing exists in the evaluation of experience: rain + being without shelter = getting wet. Soon enough the indexing of rain + wetness will emerge. This type of induction is referential, conceptual, but the level we seek to underline here is the dialogical one. Because here we are, speaking. And it is in transferring something about referentiality to each other, in reading and writing on each other, that we seek grounding for the conceptual. Much of this is also covered in [[03 Semantic noise]], [[Reference]], [[Equivalence]], [[Metaphor]]. See: [[04 Concepts as pre-dictions]] for a full article on the concept. %% https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/beyond-concepts-unicepts-language-and-natural-information/ > “A concept being given, we can always seek the drama, and _the concept would never divide or specify itself_ in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms which determine it in this way in a material system beneath all possible representation. Take the concept of truth: it is not enough to ask the abstract question “what is the true?”. Once we ask “who wants the truth, when and where, how and how much?”, our task is to assign larval subjects (the jealous person, for example), and pure spatio-temporal dynamisms (either to make the “thing” emerge in person, at a certain time, in a certain place; or to accumulate clues and signs, from moment to moment and following an endless path).” (Deleuze 1967, pp. 95-6). This is to say the same thing that Marx says about the foundation of anything from pure abstractions in the realm value dynamics, to the production of commodities: all are founded upon social relations. Or, the drama(tization). Deleuze says that what we call drama resembles the Kantian schema: “What we call drama particularly resembles the Kantian schema. For the schema according to Kant is indeed an _a priori_ determination of space and time corresponding to a concept: _the shortest_ is the drama, the dream or rather the nightmare of the straight line. It is precisely the dynamism which divides the concept of line into straight and curved, and which, moreover, in the Archimedean conception of limits, allows the measurement of the curve as a function of the straight line. Only what remains quite mysterious is how the schema has this power in relation to the concept. In a certain way, the whole of post-Kantianism attempted to elucidate the mystery of this hidden art, according to which the dynamic spatio-temporal dynamisms truly have the power to dramatise a concept, even though they are of a completely different nature. The answer is perhaps in the direction indicated by certain post-Kantians: pure spatio-temporal dynamisms have the power to dramatise _concepts_, because in the first place they actualise or incarnate _Ideas_. We possess a point of departure in order to prove this hypothesis: if it is true that the dynamisms order the two inseparable aspects of differenciation—specification and division, qualification of a species and organisation of an extension—it would be necessary for the Idea to present in turn two aspects, from which these are derived in a certain way. We must thus question the nature of the Idea, on its difference in nature to the concept.” (Deleuze 1967, p. 96). ### D&G Cannibal metaphysics intro Peter Skafish, on deleuze and guattari what is philosophy and why philosophy is equated to the concept: “The reason philosophy is virtually identified with the concept is that this prevents it from being mistaken for an even slightly rep­ resentational activity whereby it would lose its capacity to think immanence. Concepts are distinct, we quickly learn in that text, from propositions expressing truths about the world and instead lead a virtual, self-consistent existence not referring to such actual state of affairs. Whatever it is in "real" situations that provokes thought, concepts constitute a space of their own in which it is their divergence and interconnections, not the degree or quality of their correspondence, that do this work. When their virtual and also plural status is forgotten, as a famous passage in the text goes, "immanence is interpreted as immanent 'to' something," and "confusion [... ] results, so that the concept has become a transcendent universal."6 ” (p. 16). And why ZF: this is unintentionally equivocal to Plato (that is, in our contemporary view: erroneous, and also univocal = equi-vocal). ________ SEE: file:///Users/soniadejager/Downloads/[Oxford%20Series%20in%20Cognitive%20Development]%20Susan%20Carey%20-%20The%20Origin%20of%20Concepts%20(2009,%20Oxford%20University%20Press,%20USA)%20-%20libgen.li.pdf See: [[Constructivism]] for [[Kant]] on the construction of concepts in [[Mathematics]] versus [[Philosophy]]. http://www.albertovanzo.net/papers/Kant_and_Abstractionism_about_Concept_Formation-preprint.pdf https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-conceptualism/ _________ ### Peirce [[Symbol]] as [[Category]]; i.e. as [[Concept]] "A sign in the narrow sense refers to an individual object without describing it. A copy describes something without referring to it. A symbol does both: it refers to an object, as signs do, and it describes it, as copies do. The symbol is, therefore, the only kind of representation that is capable of embodying truth and falsity. It is to be noted that a symbol is not a “conventional sign,” or sign that represents certain objects in virtue of a convention. For Peirce has just defined the sign in the narrow sense (or index) as a conventional sign. Both indices and symbols may be conventional in the sense of functioning according to a convention. What distinguishes them is their import: symbols are general and can be applied to an indefinite collection of objects, while indices are singular and can only denote individual objects. I shall return to this issue later (_infra_, §1.6)". ([[Peirce's Speculative Grammar]], p. 20). [[Inference]], [[Generalization]] _________ [[Difference and Repetition]], p. 12: ![[Pasted image 20221114174914.png|300]] ________ Max Deutscher [[There is no outside-text]]: What interests me about the following is the movement that Derrida gestures towards the outside, beginning "wherever we are," tumbling into eternal recursion [[10 Bias, or Falling into Place]]. ![[Pasted image 20220927191519.png]] ____________________________________ [[Likeness]], [[Concept]], [[Metaphor]] "Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects." [[On truth and lying in a nonmoral sense]], p. 3. _______ "As would also be the case for Bachelard, the concept is the expression of a pure relation. Upon this relation the unity of the manifold lies, much as with the materialist monist intentions of Gilbert Simondon." P 208 Andrew Aitken, Philosophies of Science, Bloomsbury Companion to Continental Philo 2009 (edition 2013?) Different orientations, inclinations, of thought render different teleologies towards the construction of different realities. In thinking this we could understand the prioritization of eithet the analytic 'context of justification' (Reichenbach 1938) versus the continental 'context of discovery' (Bergson and others? See Frédéric Worms 2004), as comparable to the colloquial axiom: "there are some who don't understand reasons but only consequences." Sonia: is a concept simply a [[Pattern]] which we know is bound to change? A trans-pattern? _____________ "La Femme 100 Têtes" ________________ "I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered center, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them. Gilles Deleuze" James Williams DR p. 40 ![[diffrep 7.png]] ![[diffrep 6.png]] ![[diffrep 5.png]] ![[diffrep 4.png]] ![[diffrep 3.png]] So, so, so, so important for [[Language-modulating]] and [[11 Post-Control Script-Societies]] ![[diffrep 2.png]] _______________ %% ### Footnotes