**Links to**: [[Affirmation]], [[Dialectic]], [[Symmetry]], [[Différance]], [[Difference]], [[Refusal]], [[Semantics]], [[Nietzsche]], [[Deleuze]], [[Love]], [[◉ G E I S T ◉/Satan]], [[No.]]. >“Looking away shall be my only negation.” [[Nietzsche]], The [[Gay science]], p. 276. ### Postulate, see: [[04 Concepts as pre-dictions]]. %% In cases in which [[Interest]] is limited in time and thus expects discrete input (i.e. most cases), it can be said that negative statements contain less specificity than affirmative statements (Plato says as much in *The Sophist*, and so does Aristotle in the _Metaphysics_[^1]). If a person needs to catch a train and is expectant of getting specific information about the departure platform, it is of less relevance to hear that it does _not_ depart from platform 3, than that it departs from platform 4.[^2] This preference for the affirmative can be observed across domains, from philosophy to natural language processing (see: ), and it is of such weight that it has often been referred to as an asymmetry between affirming and negating (affirmative weighs more on the scale). However, there are also simple instances in which negation serves a generative, specifying purpose. The concept of noise is a notorious case, and even the definition of a _black hole_ has been proposed by [[Erik Curiel]] as a semantic object whose unspecificity drives its investigative specialization (see Curiel ...). Affirmation is always open to investigation, but negation especially so. [[E Pointing]], one of the most foundational of semantic activities, requires a great deal of negation. Everything that is not pointed at, in the act of pointing, is not pointed at. A negative description is generated by the sheer demand for attention to the one thing. This is nothing new, and the asymmetry here could be considered as more fundamental than the one that proposes affirmative over negating in the general game of natural language. We use prefixes such as _un-_, _de/dis-_, _ab-, non-_, etc. in order to denote unexplainable, disjunctive, abductive and non-standard situations of all sorts. These are highly _specific_, singular situations. Whereof one cannot speak, one invites speech and new knowledge by a negative prefix. The negative lurks beneath foundations as the ground which contains that which a thing is not. Treading even lighter, we might say that these opposite poles need to be reconciled beyond a simple dialectic. They are scales, degrees, _repetitive differences_ which resist conceptual specification ([[Deleuze]], [[Difference and Repetition]]), and our propositions discretize them into interests of limited scope. This is in no way a celebration of indeterminacy which leaves it _as is_, but a confrontation of it: it exists, what are we to do with it? As I quoted elsewhere ([[06 Principle of Sufficient Interest]]), [[Ray Brassier]]'s take on the transformative capacities of [[Nihilism]] bring us to the ultimate confrontation with the absolute negation of any and all meanings: "Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity. Thinking has interests that do not coincide with those of living; indeed, they can and have been pitted against the latter." p. xi, [[Nihil Unbound]]. SEP: "What in fact is a negative fact? For Bergson (1911, 289), negation is necessarily “of a pedagogical and social nature”; for Wood (1933, 421) it is “infected with error and ignorance”. According to Wittgenstein (1953, §447), “the feeling is as if the negation of a proposition had to make it true in a certain sense in order to negate it”. Givón (1978, 70) points to the discourse presuppositionality of utterances like “My wife is not pregnant”. Psycholinguistic studies have shown that negation is easier to process when the denied proposition, if not already in the discourse model, is at least a plausible addition to it (e.g., “The whale is not a fish/?bird”; cf. Wason 1965; Horn 1989, Chapter 3)." Beyond its marked status, negation has also been analyzed variously as a modality, a propositional attitude, and a speech act. The danger here is putting the pragmatic cart before the semantic horse. For example, not every negation is a speaker denial (in making this point, Frege points to the non-denial nature of embedded negation as in “If not-pp then qq”), nor is every speaker denial a linguistic negation. Given the repeated attempts over the centuries to liquidate or tame it—negation as positive difference, as dissimilarity or incompatibility, as falsity, as an admission of epistemic impoverishment, as the speech act of denial—and its resilience in surviving these attacks, negation qualifies as the Rasputin of the propositional calculus. But the prototypical use of negation is indeed as a denial of a proposition attributable to, or at least considered by, someone relevant to the discourse context. While affirmation standardly introduces a proposition into the discourse model, negation—in its “chief use” (Jespersen 1917, 4), its “most common use” (Ayer 1952, 39), its “standard and primary use” (Strawson 1952, 7)—is directed at a proposition that is already in or that can be accommodated by the discourse model." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negation/ _______________ Notes: Use the below to continue argument for [[Noise]] and [[Un]]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/ See and note: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negation/ # [[No.]] ________________________ [[Gorgias]]: _On What is Not_, "three sceptical conclusions: first, that there is nothing; secondly, that if there is anything it cannot be known; thirdly, that if anything can be known it cannot be communicated by one person to another. This suite of arguments has been handed down in two forms, once in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise _On Melissus_, and once by [[Sextus Empiricus]]." ([[Anthony Kenny]], AP, p. 31). [[Principle of Sufficient Reason]] _______________ **Abstract** In recent years, Irad Kimhi, Michael Della Rocca and Anton Koch articulated three new solutions to the so-called Parmenidean Puzzle. To begin with, I will present this puzzle, and summarize Kimhi's and Della Rocca's solutions. After arguing that such solutions _appear_ to be inconsistent with each other, I will discuss Koch's approach to the Parmenidean Puzzle and show that, if deemed to be correct, his approach can accommodate both Kimhi's and Della Rocca's solutions.  I will also show that, in developing his approach, Koch reaches what he calls '_the singularity of thinking and being_' and, in so doing, he committees himself to what he labels 'the antinomy of negation'. To conclude, I will argue that Koch's engagement with such an antinomy leads him to face some important issues, and I will suggest that he could overcome them by appealing to paraconsistent logic and dialetheism. In other words, I will argue that, given his approach to the Parmenidean Puzzle, Koch would be better off admitting that 'the singularity of thinking and being' forces us to face _the truth of_ 'the antinomy of negation'.  **General Presentation** A bizarre paradox runs through the history of philosophy. Since the time of Aristotle, philosophy has been defined as the knowledge of the universal, and what is singular is excluded from the domain of what is knowable. At the same time, however, the history of philosophy has continually been confronted - starting with Aristotle, and even earlier with Plato - with the problem of defining what it means to be singular. The notion of 'singularity' is intertwined with - and distinguished from - other fundamental terms in the philosophical lexicon: the one, the individual, the person, the absolute, but also the contingent, the unrepeatable, the unexpected. It seems to define at the same time what is lowest and irrelevant (a detail, a contingency) and what is supreme and of utmost importance (the absolute, God). In modern thought, the possibility of clearly distinguishing between the singular and the universal is radically called into question. Philosophical interest in history and art leads one to challenge the idea that philosophy cannot deal with the singular. The birth of Aesthetics and Philosophy of history, as well as the philosophical meditation on the contingent and evenemential aspects of human life, constitute a new stage in the relationship of philosophical thought to the category of the singular. The aim of this seminar series will be to discuss the notion of the 'singular' starting from the history of philosophical thought, but also in relation to the use of this term in the contemporary debate. The research hypothesis is that philosophy still has to come to terms with the notion of the singular, and that thinking deeply about this notion can help us to shed light on some theoretical problems still open today. **Further info and full program:**  [https://philevents.org/event/show/124506](https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fphilevents.org%2Fevent%2Fshow%2F124506&data=05%7C02%7Cdejager%40ESPHIL.EUR.NL%7Cfe36438b97a342261cda08dc954d3ee2%7C715902d6f63e4b8d929b4bb170bad492%7C0%7C0%7C638549406213565664%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Wjja7Y8dQttnia8jjy87cC4qPcCmDQLQaL%2BzJfoh80I%3D&reserved=0 "Original URL: https://philevents.org/event/show/124506. Click or tap if you trust this link.") _______________ **See also**: [^1]: "The affirmative proposition is prior to and better known than the negative (since affirmation explains denial just as being is prior to not-being) (_Metaphysics_ 996b14–16)" SEP. [^2]: But even this is arbitrary. The repercussions of an analysis of this are subject to cascading contextual issues as well: in some cases it could be _rather specific_ to hear "it does not depart from platform 3", leading the person _standing on platform 3_ to run as fast as possible toward the station hall, in order to look at the departure signs as well as get closer to the desired platform. Temporal scope _and_ interest are crucial contextual details in these analyses.