Here be only an incomplete list of gravitational metaphors, supporting the arguments in [[10 Bias, or Falling into Place]]. In this chapter I looked at how both reason and intuition, which are often diametrically opposed in discussions of how the mind does what the mind does, are subject to the same gravitational constraints, and therefore functionally very similar. These functions reveal themselves in so many of our metaphors: as gradient descent, bias and kernels in the mathematical imaginary of machine learning, to most philosophical arguments. We can have fundamental bearing on the “weighing” of arguments, because considerations have “gravity” which depend on the “depths” of thought: as profound and deep versus shallow or superficial thinking. We have “higher” and “lower” truths. We are “inclined” to think, we “ascend” or “rise” to the occasion through “bottom-up” or “top-down” approaches. Sometimes we “lower” our expectations. We also “anchor” or “uproot” our beliefs, stand on “solid” or “shaky foundations,” our claims “hang together” but also “fall apart” or “topple” others, “stabilizing” or “destabilizing” “erected” architectures. Ideas have “pull;” “attraction,” and “momentum”. And being _pensive_, or in thoughtful contemplation, stems from the Latin _pensare_, originally related to weighing and hanging. All metaphors grounded in gravitation refining the function(s) of mind, through the refinement of concepts. Gradient descent Bias Kernel Vector Sink  Fundament Argument weighing Lightweight vs. heavyweight  Gravity of considerations Depths of thought Profound/deep vs. shallow/superficial Higher and lower truths Inclinations to think Ascending/rising  Bottom-up/top-down Lower and higher expectations Anchor/uproot beliefs Solid/shaky foundations Hang together Fall apart/topple Stabilize/destabilize Erected architectures Seat (of reason) Pull, attraction, momentum Pensive/weighing/hanging Leaning toward, tilting Tipping point, tipping the scales Burden of proof Levity vs. gravity Grounded vs. ungrounded Buoyant ideas that float vs. sink Suspended judgment Prop up, buttress, shore up (arguments) Crumble, collapse, cave in Bedrock principles Cornerstone, keystone concepts scaffolding of thought Building blocks Center of gravity Orbit around (central ideas) Gravitational pull Dense vs. light reasoning Counterweight, counterbalance Balanced argument,  Or: to lose one's balance Hang by a thread Pendulum swing Support Unearth Excavate etc. (there are many more and LLMs have not yet shown me their power in finding them. Goes to show: there are estimations that remain conditioned upon the human body.)         %% [[Bergson]], [[Metaphor]], [[Melody]], [[Music]], [[Intuition]] "Commentators appear to assume that Bergson’s philosophy is not literally based on music or harmonics; however, in The Creative Mind, [[Bergson]]’s opening words are: ‘What philosophy has lacked most of all is precision (‘Introduction I’, in C.M., p.11), so if precision is his primary concern, why would he say that duration or the inner life “is that very melody” (‘Introduction I’, in C.M., p.19), or that our personality is “precisely the continuous melody of our inner life” (‘The Perception of Change’, C.M., p.149) if he intended the melody to be taken metaphorically? For Bergson intuition, which is durational, pre-exists intellect which thinks in terms of space. The intellect has to use spatial metaphors to explain that which is experienced immediately through intuition; however, as Harris notes, Bergson struggles to explain duration using spatial metaphors: Bergson proposes one explanatory metaphor for duration after another, only to find them inadequate, if not deceptive. In essence, we find that Bergson lacks any notion of “space” or spatial metaphors which would accommodate the definitive characteristics of his concept of multiplicity. The chief impasse lies in that fact that qualitative or continuous multiplicity entails “reciprocal penetration,” a tangled weave of sorts, and Bergson could not find a visual or spatial analogue because he equated space in general with the Euclidean space of common sense. (Harris, 2004, p.102)"