**Links to**: [[12 Negintelligibility]], [[Neguinteligibilidad]], [[Edging thermodynamic equilibrium]], [[Non-philosophy]], [[Non-linearity]], [[Virtual]], [[05 Prediction]], [[Possibility]], [[Out of phase]], [[Complexity]], [[Simplicity]], [[Pattern]], [[Patternicity]].   _When something that attempts to explain everything doesn’t just explain nothing._   ### [[Question]]: Can we have _one final metaphor_?   >The universal absolute cannot be thought except as an exorbitant index of exteriority. > >R. Negarestani, _Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture_ Vol. 8 / No. 2 / Summer 2011, p. 33.   >The first and simplest kind of truth is the resemblance of a copy. It may be roughly stated to consist in a sameness of predicates. [. . .] A false copy is one which claims to resemble an object which it does not resemble. But this never fully occurs, for two reasons; in the first place, the falsehood does not lie in the copy itself but in the _claim_ which is made for it, in the _superscription_ for instance; in the second place, as there must be _some_ resemblance between the copy and its object, this falsehood cannot be entire. Hence there is no absolute truth or falsehood of copies. > >C. S. Peirce, first Harvard lecture, W 1:169–170. (p. 19).   >Copies are therefore not bearers of truth-values, indices (like a person’s name) are conventional and do not have genuine generality, so not fit for logic either. Logic deals with symbols. > >(ibid., p. 20).   > All models are wrong. > > G. Box, 1976.   >... the method of negative theology that deems God to be inaccessible to finite human beings, save for an oblique _via negativa_. > >M. Marder 2017, p. 30.   >El lector que tiene en sus manos _Ficciones_ es una persona en la frontera, un ser humano que está a punto de abandonar el mundo seguro y confortable del que está hecha la vida cotidiana para adentrarse en un territorio absolutamente nuevo. Borges descubre en su obra, o quizás inventa, otra dimensión de lo real. > >J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero, prólogo _Ficciones_ (1941-1956, versión: 2001, Madrid, Biblioteca El Mundo).   >Uniformity is undesirable. Leaving something incomplete makes it interesting, and gives one the feeling that there is room for growth. > >Yoshida Kenko (_Lessons in Idleness_, cited from Marcus du Satoy [missing]).   >What memorizes or retains is not a capacity of the mind, not even accessibility to what occurs, but, in the event, the ungraspable and undeniable ‘presence’ of a something which is other than mind and which, ‘from time to time’, occurs... > >Lyotard, 1991 (1988), p. 75. > >But then again, who does know enough about _now_? Ibid., p. 90.   There are many more related citations that I have not finished compiling here. Below is a catalogue of what has been called by many names, and in this context we call _negintelligibility_. In no particular order other than the order I initially ran into and/or thought of these things, or they came to mind: ### The _schein_ of negintelligibility^[N.B.: this concept inspired the paper on [[08 Active ignorance]].] _To be published, currently work in progress._ %% Absential features in Deacon Reason in Whitehead (see also: [[Ingression]]) The problem sphere in van der Leeuw and Dirks, 2023, p. 7 Satan’s schematism Lyotard’s inhuman The Lacanian real *is* negintelligibility (the symbolic is simplification, the imaginary is complexification) The negative theology as an early inkling of _how_ to know. [[Entropomorfismo]] Science itself is aphasic (Klossowski), or as aimless (where this is problematic, for e.g.: Maxwell’s [[Aim-oriented Empiricism]]) Kant's _infinite judgment_ Avant-garde, cutting edge, avant-la-lettre what we **do not see we do not see** (Maturana and Varela 1987, p. 19) Open versus closed or narrow minded The “gap” that is between a student and their future knowledge Actual-virtual in Deleuze Différance The not-yet Irruption (theory) Entropic brain hypothesis Negations which create novel ground Noumenon (not as a designation: rather as a driver of knowledge-production) [[The Cloude of Unknowyng]] Nicolas of Cusa The imperfect versus the perfect in William James Thirdness (or semeiotic levels) in Peirce In type theory a proposition is not just a statement that is either true or false (classical logical proposition); but rather a type P whose terms p : P are its proofs. So the _performatic_ act of proving P is the construction of a term p : P. Given the negation of P we can define P as mapping onto the empty type. You, Z.f., trying to get outside of whatever field you’ve ever been in What falls through the cracks _Deceit_, lying, or simply not telling something in order to inspire speculation Subliminality: hiding something in plain sight Conspiracy as highly advanced speculation Less is more “All I know is I don’t know” Absence over presence To think is to forget Kintsugi, and wabi-sabi in general Productive frames and enabling constraints Divination by randomness Exaptation (Gould + Vrba, moving on from Darwin’s “pre-adaptation” as too teleological) Love/know your enemy What hangs together (Sellars) What shows itself in logic (Wittgenstein) What emanates from a metaphor or appears in an analogy What escapes a tautology Feeding noise to a system The Nietzschean lie, Nietzschean order Non-philosophy Tarrying with the negative Borges Learning from the fool, the joker, etc. Rejecting the call to order Geist, ghost, spectre, etc. Weird and eerie (Mark Fisher) Uncanny (valley) Un/incategorical “this can’t be all there is” The sublime The abyss Bataille the one and many, and the excess/inaccessible Hexagram 64, not yet fording, not yet complete Wuwei Confusion, cognitive dissonance Schismogenesis in Bateson P. 387 in The order of things: can can appear, possibility... Territory - deterritorialized How do we learn anew, if we do not attempt a plunge into total unknowing? Less than Zero, Zizek Absent blue wax, Nathan Brown [[Unconscious subliminality or conspiracy]] Approximations to representation are revealing of the _testing_ that can be done at the _edges_ AI as moving mileposts Apparent reason, PSR (there must be a reason) The _shape_ of questions Double contingency as presented by Luhmann The incompleteness of any concept which depends on its situated application The hard problem of consciousness Avidyā >Avidyā (compound of a- prefix and vidya, thus: “not vidya”, from the Sanskrit root vid: “to see, to knowingly-see, to know”: avidyā “not to see, not to know.” > 1. PSR: the desire for simplicity in the face of the complex; 2. The negative/negation and dialectics as transitions between simple and complex;  3. Difference: the ontological condition, and that which as a concept renders the recognition of transitions possible; 4. Embedding and encoding in compression and computation; 5. Circularity; identity; A = A: simplicity, or A ≠ A or both or neither or (A = A) = (A ≠ A): complexity; 6. Kolmogorov complexity: simplification/compressibility of performable patterns; 7. What shows itself in logic (Wittgenstein) as ratio or metastable pattern; 8. Games (incl. grammar) as simplification and complexification: where patterns are employed towards closed-world strategies which can lead to high complexity if explored and expanded through vast temporal scales (e.g. chess or soccer). ... Continue reading at: [[12 Negintelligibility]]. ![[Pasted image 20230603150345.png]] From Yagmur: Robert Rosen complex vs. complicated jesper hoffmeyer double code biosemiotics Canguilhem - the knowledge of life (look into) New insight: orthogonality thesis in light of negintelligibility, changing your goals as a kind of random seed value that leads to openness and novelty. Look again at 1:35 Robert Miles on MLST . "Are emergent abilities of language models a mirage?" Goodhart's law. Dutch book and Dutch book and losing resources. Joseph Kosuth, _Art After Philosophy and After_: ![[kosuth after philo.png|300]] Treat Ayer and Urmson quote (Ayer = obviously religion, i.e.: hyperstition, conduces knowledge, and Urmson: same for confusion). Elaborate on the unsaid (on its own terms, and also in relation to all the un-, anti-, non-, etc. you treated elsewhere). Explain why things like the nuomenon, the absolute, Bergson’s intuition or Deleuze’s virtual miss the crucial attractor aspect of negintelligibility because mark the designation space for negintellibility as if it was simply that which falls out of knowledge. Bergson and Deleuze get it right though, particularly Deleuze, by showing how it drives supposedly stable knowledge. Don't forget in "all models are wrong" Negintelligibility refers to that which falls beyond or outside the limits of intelligibility or comprehension. It refers to something that cannot be fully grasped or understood by the human mind or senses. However, various philosophical concepts, such as the nuomenon, the absolute, Bergson's intuition, and Deleuze's virtual, often miss the crucial attractor aspect of negintelligibility. One reason for this is that these concepts tend to designate negintelligibility as that which simply falls out of knowledge. That is, they see negintelligibility as something that is beyond the realm of our understanding and comprehension. They mark a boundary between the knowable and the unknowable and assume that negintelligibility exists on the other side of that boundary. However, this perspective fails to capture the dynamic and interactive nature of negintelligibility as that which functions as an attractor for the known, something which, in essence, is failing to become itself in these very observations.Negintelligibility should be viewed as a potentiality within the known, a source of creativity and innovation that allows us to challenge our preconceived notions and push the boundaries of our understanding. It is not a static entity that exists independently from our knowledge, but rather a fundamental part of the process by which we construct knowledge. In order to fully appreciate the role of negintelligibility in the production of knowledge, we need to adopt a more dynamic and relational view of knowledge as a constantly evolving process. This means recognizing that negintelligibility is not simply a limit to our understanding, but an active force that can transform and shape our knowledge. By embracing negintelligibility as a potentiality of the known, we can open ourselves up to new possibilities and perspectives that would otherwise remain hidden. This requires a willingness to embrace uncertainty and ambiguity, and to recognize that our knowledge is always subject to revision and Negintelligibility is a concept in Bataille's philosophy that refers to the limits of human understanding and the impossibility of fully comprehending certain experiences or phenomena. It is closely related to the idea of sovereignty, which refers to the excess or transgression of boundaries. In Bataille's view, human existence is characterized by a tension between the rational, spiritual realm and the material, bodily realm. While some aspects of human existence may appear to be spiritual or rational, they are ultimately underwritten by a material or bodily component that can overrun them. Bataille is preoccupied with the unstable in-between space where "sovereign communication" between The concept of life and death, knowledge and unknowing, and the possible and impossible are all intertwined according to Bataille. He posits that communication can bring individuals together into a shared ontological ground, moving away from a sense of separate "beings." Bataille's philosophy delves into the complexities of the relationship between life and death, and he purports that encountering negintelligibility is a vital aspect of this exploration. Bataille's philosophy is characterized by the experience of negintelligibility, which refers to the limits of human understanding and the impossibility of fully comprehending certain experiences or phenomena. Here are some examples of negintelligibility in Bataille's writings: Bataille's literary works are not directly autobiographical, though they frequently borrow from his life. Unfortunately, he only remembered the bad times, leaving us with the (probably) mistaken impression of "a black and completely accursed life"1 . Bataille's philosophy escapes oppositional, either/or logic; it is unlocatable because it constitutes a constant transgression of limits2 . Bataille's philosophy is an exploration of the continuities and discontinuities between life and death, and he believes that the experience of negintelligibility is an essential part of this exploration3 . Bataille's preferred literary device was the metonym, which he used to bring the transgressive world, with its extreme experiences, into all aspects of his writing4 . Bataille's philosophy is characterized by a need for sensibility to call up disturbance, and he defines it as "a need for sensibility to call up disturbance"5 . Bataille's philosophy is grounded in personal experience, in particular his childhood with a suicidal mother and a blind, syphilitic father5 . Bataille's philosophy implies a confrontation with death and a celebration of the forgetfulness of selfhood2 . Don't forget in "all models are wrong": it's not that they don't "capture"reality, it's precisely that wrong is right. Scaling in Levin as simplicity complexity contractions Levin and Bob: Shannon information is most at the border of the cell Chris and Levin: meaning Levin and josh baumgarten: polycomputation, situations being observer-dependant means that we can squeeze more computational power out of a thing, is not by changing the thing, but by changing the observer: different computational results depending on the observer, means more novelty Karl Friston and stress: how do my inner models change depending on cortisol levels For pattern butcher but also for complexity, simplicity Chen, Swingle and others think that, if an equilibrated system looks boring and blah, we’re just not looking at it in the right way. The action has moved from quantities that we can see directly to highly delocalized ones that require new measures to track. The favorite measure, at the moment, is known as circuit complexity. The concept originated in computer science and has been appropriated — misappropriated, some have grumbled — to quantify the blossoming patterns in a quantum system. The work is fascinating for the way it brings together multiple areas of science, not just black holes but also quantum chaos, topological phases of matter, cryptography, quantum computers, and the possibility of even more powerful machines. ___ From “Everything and Nothing” Gabriel and Priest, intro: “As for Priest, I discovered his ground breaking work in logic and metaphysics shortly afterwards, when I was trying to figure out the meaning of Meillassoux’s “contradictory entity,” an enigmatic concept he introduces in After Finitnde: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Meillassoux writes: >As contradictory, this entity is always-already whatever it is not. Thus, the introduction of a contradictory entity into being would result in the implosion of the very idea of determination - of being such and such, of being this rather than that. Such an entity would be tantamount to a “black hole of differences”, into which all alterity would be irremediably swallowed up, since the being-other of this entity would be obliged, simply by virtue of being other than it, not to be other than it.3 What was this entity which was said to be every single thing and nothing in particular, an illogical something that seemed to defy ontological classification? And how was it different from Priest’s own account of nothing(ness), which he likewise defined as a paradoxical yet not completely illogical entity - both an object and the absence of all objects? (_Meillassoux (1008), p. 70._) (pp. 2-3. intro) Markus Gabriel’s fields-of-sense ontology. Off the record, we also touched on the meaning of Meillassoux’s contradictory entity, with Priest making the important observation that Meillassoux never actually endorses the possibility of a contradictory object in After Finitiide. Indeed, he does quite the opposite: for the French philosopher, a truly contradictory entity is inconceivable in the context of his ontological materialism, which embraces radical contingency while affirming the principle of identity in order to differentiate his own take on speculation from earlier approaches that took the form of differential process ontologies. This is why Meillassoux also writes that, >Accordingly, real contradiction can in no way be identified with the thesis of universal becoming, for in becoming, things must be this, then other than this; they are, then they are not. This does not involve any contradiction, since the entity is never simultaneously this and its opposite, existent and non-existent. A really illogical entity consists rather in the systematic destruction of the minimal conditions for all becoming, it suppresses the dimension of alterity required for the deployment of any process whatsoever, liquidating it in the formless being which must always already be what it is not. (_Meillassoux (1008), p. 70._) p. 3 “Strictly speaking, Meillassoux’s contradictory entity is not an object but a limit concept introduced from a negative heuristic to set the limits of his speculative enterprise, which, as I understand it, should be interpreted not as a form of materialism but as a study of modality.'’ By contrast, Priest’s conception of nothing(ness) as a paradoxical entity which is simultaneously an object and the absence of all objects is presented as a true contradiction and as the ground of reality. In other words, the ground of reality for Priest is neither a super-chaotic and hyper-contingent Great Outdoors (Meillassoux), nor a primordial flux of vital becoming (Bergson), nor an aesthetic realm of intensive processes (Whitehead), virtual multiplicities or larval subjects (Deleuze). Instead, the ground of reality is nothing(ness) understood as a truly contradictory entity — an entity which does not exist because it is not embedded in the spatio-temporal and causal nexus but nevertheless possesses a reality of its own: the reality that makes it what it is. If, with the notion of hyper-chaos, Meillassoux sought to differentiate his philosophy not only from the above-mentioned Heideggerian/Derridean orthodoxy but also from its more affirmative and crypto-vitalistic alternative (the kind of relational/dynamic metaphysics introduced by Bergson and Whitehead and perfected by Deleuze and Latour), in Priest we find a “persistence of the negative”7 that returns him anew to the Kant-Hegel-Heidegger axis that earlier analytic philosophers - following in the footsteps of Moore and Russell - had rejected at the turn of the twentieth century. More importantly for our purposes, Priest’s emphasis on nothing(ness) brings him in close proximity to the New Realism of Gabriel, which, unlike other forms of continental realism, is heavily influenced by German idealism and Husserlian/ Heideggerian phenomenology. ” p. 3 “For Gabriel, the nothing is a **limit concept** much in the same way as Meillassoux’s contradictory entity is a limit concept. We catch a glimpse of the “nothing” as distinct from nothingness when we try to think about the “world” _qua_ mega-object or all-encompassing totality, which does not and cannot exist. For the world to exist it would have to constitute itself as the field of sense of all fields of senses, which is impossible in a truly pluralistic universe disconnected from the Parmenidean axis. For Priest, on the other hand, the mega-object everything is an object like any other, albeit one as paradoxical as the object “nothing” insofar as everything can be a proper parr of itself.” (ibid. p 10, my emphasis in bold) %% ### Footnotes