**Links to**: [[Perception]], [[05 Prediction]], [[Salience]], [[Sense data]], [[Embodiment]], [[Active inference]], [[05 Prediction]], [[Cognition]], [[Appearance]], [[Aesthetics]], [[Aesthesis]], [[Cognition]], [[Consciousness]], [[Self-evidence]], [[Self-consciousness]], [[Folk psychology]], etc. ### For extended thoughts on this, see the chapter on attention: [[11 Post-Control Script-Societies]]. Below some loose notes and citations. >... within the predictive-processing framework, attention is not something one “focuses” or “deploys” ([Anderson, 2011](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721415570732?casa_token=iqF0m11vMZMAAAAA:ymUM9uFl2qdWT1bYIVIxNEW2-zUie8fO3Ap5h7H3oWWoF74JivqoLjfz-Q3QiG9KmGFxdvI4t8Ww0A#bibr8-0963721415570732)). Rather, it is the mechanism of variable precision weighting itself. When one “attends” to something, small deviations from expectations are weighed more than when one is not attending to it ([Den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721415570732?casa_token=iqF0m11vMZMAAAAA:ymUM9uFl2qdWT1bYIVIxNEW2-zUie8fO3Ap5h7H3oWWoF74JivqoLjfz-Q3QiG9KmGFxdvI4t8Ww0A#bibr17-0963721415570732); [Feldman & Friston, 2010](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721415570732?casa_token=iqF0m11vMZMAAAAA:ymUM9uFl2qdWT1bYIVIxNEW2-zUie8fO3Ap5h7H3oWWoF74JivqoLjfz-Q3QiG9KmGFxdvI4t8Ww0A#bibr19-0963721415570732)). As a result, the neural representations of an object that is being attended (because it is task relevant) are measurably different than those of the same object when it is not attended (e.g., [Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721415570732?casa_token=iqF0m11vMZMAAAAA:ymUM9uFl2qdWT1bYIVIxNEW2-zUie8fO3Ap5h7H3oWWoF74JivqoLjfz-Q3QiG9KmGFxdvI4t8Ww0A#bibr15-0963721415570732)). > >Lupyan & Clark 2015. >It is more controversial to claim, as the advocates of this theory do, that “attention is nothing but precision optimization in hierarchical inference”. > >Hohwy, 1014, p. 244, citing Feldman & Friston, 2010. >Ransom _et al_. have suggested that, by taking attention _always_ to be precision optimization, this theory struggles to account for certain forms of voluntary attention (Ransom _et al_. 2017). Clark has suggested that this challenge can be met if the sources of voluntary attention are identified with beliefs, rather than desires. > > SEP entry on attention. %% ### precision weighting, relevance and attention “The idea pursued in this paper is that attention corresponds to inference about uncertainty or precision and that this inference is encoded by dynamic changes in post-synaptic gain. However, non-linear (gain) post- synaptic responses are ubiquitous in the brain; so what is special about the non-linearities associated with attention? We suggest that attention is mediated by gain modulation of prediction error-units (forward or bottom-up information) in contradistinction to gain modulation of prediction units (backward, lateral or top-down information). In other words, non-linearities in the brain’s generative model encoding context-sensitive expectations are distinct from non-linearities (gain) entailed by optimal recognition. The distinction may seem subtle but there is a fundamental difference between inferring the context-dependent contingencies and causes of sensations (perception) and their precision (attention). In this sense, there is an implicit distinction between inferring what is relevant for a task (as in classical attention tasks like dichotic listening) and the uncertainty about what is relevant.” Conclusion in Harriet and Friston 2010, p. 18. # From active affordance to active inference: vertical integration of cognition in the cerebral cortex through dual subcortical control systems Phan Luu, Don M Tucker, K Friston, 2023 In previous papers, we proposed that the dorsal attention system’s top-down control is regulated by the dorsal division of the limbic system, providing a feedforward or impulsive form of control generating expectancies during active inference. In contrast, we proposed that the ventral attention system is regulated by the ventral limbic division, regulating feedback constraints and error-correction for active inference within the neocortical hierarchy. Here, we propose that these forms of cognitive control reflect vertical integration of subcortical arousal control systems that evolved for specific forms of behavior control. The feedforward impetus to action is regulated by phasic arousal, mediated by lemnothalamic projections from the reticular activating system of the lower brainstem, and then elaborated by the hippocampus and dorsal limbic division. In contrast, feedback constraint—based on environmental requirements—is regulated by the tonic activation furnished by collothalamic projections from the midbrain arousal control centers, and then sustained and elaborated by the amygdala, basal ganglia, and ventral limbic division. In an evolutionary-developmental analysis, understanding these differing forms of _active affordance—_for arousal and motor control within the subcortical vertebrate neuraxis—may help explain the evolution of _active inference_ regulating the cognition of expectancy and error-correction within the mammalian 6-layered neocortex. " Tucker and Luu are one of the only people in google scholar linking Roger Shepard to Active inference —- Note in signal: argument about attention-driven self-evidencing as a system gone awry. Relate the mechanism of this to example of KL divergence https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kullback%E2%80%93Leibler_divergence -> https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-50138-8 Add notes on LLMs and Attention is all you need TAKAGI Saori uses Bence Nanay’s attention typology: ![[attention japanese colleague.png]] social attention https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-009-0233-3#citeas