**Links to**: [[Kant]], [[Brentano]], [[Husserl]], [[Phenomenology]], [[Logic of sense]], [[Interest]], [[Perception]], [[Sense]], [[Interest]], [[Desire]]. # About: _Aboutness_. ### Intentionality Brentano 1874, vol. 1, 115–16: “Every psychological phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we would call, albeit not entirely unambiguously, relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is here not to be understood as a reality), or immanent objectivity. Every psychological phenomenon contains something as an object within itself, although not each in the same way. In representation something is represented, in judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of psychological phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar. And so we can define psychological phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena that intentionally contain an object in themselves.””[^2] ### Protentions Dewey: “Interest is first active, projective, or propulsive. We _take_ interest.” (Dewey, Interest and Effort, p. 16). What [[Husserl]] “called ‘protentions’, (beliefs, expectations, hopes, fears, wishes, dreams and desires, but also **motives and reasons** (in every sense): all the ways of anticipating what is yet to come in order to decide how to face it"[^1] are in every way related to [[Interest]], as interest is guided by the contingency of retention (memory, the already lived) as oriented towards the future. Following [[Bergson]] we should tend to think that these two cannot be separated as this is a combinatorial enterprise. Following [[Predictive processing]] we should understand them as predictions. ____________________ ### Footnotes [^1]: Bishop, Ryan, and Daniel Ross. “Technics, Time and the Internation: Bernard Stiegler’s Thought–A Dialogue with Daniel Ross.” _Theory, Culture & Society_ 38.4 (2021): 111-133. [^2]: [[Anja Jauernig]], [[The World According to Kant]], p. 33.