**Links to**: [[Geist]], [[Nature builds no machines]], [[B The being of “mere” machines and “mere” propositions]], [[Sense]], [[Attention]], [[Cannibalism]], [[Atropofágia]], [[Drive]], [[Desire]] [[Emergence]], [[Machine]], [[Mechanism]], [[Meat]], [[Interest]], [[Desiring machine]], [[Selfæta]], [[Entropicalia]]. >“Tupi or not Tupi, that is the question.” _Manifesto Antropófago_, 1928. >“Man becomes a puppet of what he outers of himself.” Marshall McLuhan, circa 1960.^[M. McLuhan to Wilfred and Sheila Watson, 6 May 196?. Cited in Chrystall 2008, p. 156. Chrystall notes: “Please note that the identification of the exact year of this letter is problematic.”] ### [[Question]]: “Which is more real: the _meat_ or the _puppet_?” Said the meat-puppet.^[This phrase was a joke by S. de Jager to Sami Hammana during one of their P3 2022 “Wreading and riting” classes.] ![[Os_Filhos_de_Pindorama._Cannibalism_in_Brazil_in_1557.jpg|500]] <small>Fig. 1. Depiction of Cannibalism in Brazil in 1557, based on description by Hans Staden. Wikipedia tells us that in an anecdotal recapitulation, the Tupinamba gave Staden soup; and “after finishing his dinner, he found in the bottom of the cauldron some small skulls, which he later found out to be those of the boys in his choir.” It is also noted that anthropologist William Arens, has argued that Staden provided far too sensational accounts of cannibalism. The engraving is by Théodore de Bry, 1562, public domain.</small> The concept of meat puppet, like that of [[Xpectator]], brings attention to two contemporary facts: 1) we are made of meat, 2) we are puppets to ourselves (i.e., we self-model). Following the turning of taboo into totem by the [[Manifesto Antropófago]], our question answers itself, rhetorically: the meat-puppet’s doubling-down on itself is the wheel that keeps things turning: not only eating itself, but also asking: who am I? How do I become? ### Volitional meat In light of our excursion into _interest_ (see: [[06 Principle of Sufficient Interest]]): how is it that we, meat-puppets and puppetteers, become interested? In terms of “basic” drives and “hidden”, bottomless desires given by exploding stars, the answers can range anywhere from hormonal fluctuations to electromagnetic radiation and our unavoidable status as susceptible _meat-eors_. The concept of meat puppet is simply a funny version of the Deleuzian desiring machine (please follow: [[B The being of “mere” machines and “mere” propositions]]). Sjoerd van Tuinen: “What replaces psychology, the interpretation of the affective waverings of the soul, is physiology – the pathic logic of the will to power. The body, with its nervous system, cells, tissue, organs, and secretions, does not think but is what compels us to think. Pathos precedes the subjective of enunciation and constitutes the place in the world that the subject occupies. It defines a perspective – the implicit condition for there to be any empirical fact at all. At the same time, what first resounds as a cry is always at risk of becoming idle chatter. Physiology concerns the necessary relation or consistency (ethos) between pathos and logos. It matters who says something. Each type of will knows and perceives ressentiment in the way that it deserves, that is, in the ethical modality that corresponds to its own capacity to be affected.” (2024, p. 18). But why: “**does not think** but _compels_ us to think”? If eukaryotic cells want sugar and result in an organism (single- or multicellular) _moving_ towards sugar, which also leads to **not** wanting sugar anymore, this, to me, is *thinking*. This is the means to an end by way of an abstract operation: direction, from which any modality ensues. Movement _towards_ sugar is only related to the simplicity of sugar itself insofar as carbohydrates are needed to generate adenosine triphosphate and thus locomotion. The question in question is then, which came first: sugar or locomotion (towards it)? Does it matter or make sense to apply this linear, abstract logic to the volitions of meat when it is itself pulled apart in a myriad of gradients—sugar and otherwise—exploding like stellar, sideral (that is: _desiring_) singularities in all possible directions? As neuroendocrinologist Bruce McEwen states: >“... “mind” includes not only what goes on in the brain but also the visceral sensations, including pain, as well as inflammatory states and many other processes that take place throughout the body. These components influence mood, attention and arousal and have effects on cognitive function. The examples of allostatic overload cited above — the acceleration of atherosclerosis and increased risk for cardiovascular disease and stroke, abdominal obesity — involve both the brain and the body, as do loss of minerals from bone, immunosuppression and alterations in the circuitry of the hippocampus, amygdala and prefrontal cortex, especially the hippocampus. Many of these conditions are seen in patients with chronic mood and anxiety disorders, and thus it is important to pay attention to the allostatic overload associated with these disorders, since they involve the whole body and not just the brain in isolation. > >The final message, then, is that with new biomedical knowledge, the concept of stress has evolved from the ideas originally proposed by Hans Selye. Attention is now focused on how the mediators of the stress response can promote adaptation in the aftermath of acute stress and yet contribute to the allostatic overload that results from being “stressed out.” This conceptual framework has created a need to know how to improve the efficiency of the adaptive response to stressors while minimizing overactivity of these systems, since such overactivity results in many of the common diseases of modern life. %% Machines are the new gods, Golems (Wiener 1964), and the new death. Bongard and Levin ask, in light of our endless analogizing between meats and machines: “does a suitable machine metaphor apply sufficiently to biology to facilitate experimental and conceptual progress?” (2012, p. 2). According to the authors, modern “machines” are increasingly occupying right-ward positions on this continuum Some may have preferences, which avails the experimenter of the technique of rewards and punishments—a more sophisticated control method than rewiring, but not as sophisticated as persuasion (the latter requires the system to be a logical agent, able to comprehend and be moved by arguments, not merely triggered by signals). Examples of transitions include turning the sensors of state outward, to include others’ stress as part of one’s action policies, and eventually the meta-goal of committing to enhance one’s agency, intelligence, or compassion (increase the scope of goals one can pursue). A more negative example is becoming sophisticated enough to be susceptible to a “thought that breaks the thinker” (e.g., existential or skeptical arguments that can make one depressed or even suicidal, Gödel paradoxes, etc.)—massive changes can be made in those systems by a very low-energy signal because it is treated as information in the context of a complex host computational machinery. These agents exhibit a degree of multi-scale plasticity that enables informational input to make strong changes in the structure of the cognitive system itself.” (Levin 2022, p. 4). _______________ [[Emile Cioran]] "nos volvemos líricos cuando..." Usar esta frase para cortisol deficiency. _______________ _______________ Meat quote in Clark's [[Surfing Uncertainty]]. _______________ Check Negri and Jodi Dean's comments on control of soverignity vis a vis meat puppet (meat **heap**) _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ _______________ %% ### Footnotes