**Links to**: [[Learning]], [[Rule induction]], [[Pattern]], [[Metalearning]], [[Learning language]], [[06 Principle of Sufficient Interest]], [[Engines of Order]], [[Imitation]], [[Turing test]], [[Turing machine]]. ### [[Postulate]]: The history of AI is the history of finding the right rules. Unfortunately, we quickly _derail_ into ethics. %% Lorraine Daston, rules nomology (n.) 1825, "study of what relates to society" (obsolete); 1845, in philosophy, "**science of the fundamental laws of thinking**;" 1879, "science of law and legislation," from Greek nomos "usage, law, custom" (from PIE root *nem- "to assign, allot; to take") + -logy. Related: Nomologist; nomologistical. Perhaps the most banal thing that can be said about rules is that they presuppose general, one-size-fits-all solutions to otherwise always singular and variable problems. Return to all this for [[Resonance presentation]], write a paper [[Paper ideas]] about Rules, Patterns and (Choice) sequences in the context of [[Meaning as use]] which you go against. How not to write truisms when you think that the solution is a) being open to novelty, and accepting of one's rigidity (bias, etc.) b) the problem is simply egoism and by extension, capitalism? [[Pattern]], [[Choice sequences]], [[Rule induction]] Ostensive, Induction, [[E Pointing]] “If you take care of the syntax, the semantics take care of itself!” (Haugeland 1981: 23) — > what is the problem with this? If you have the right rules it will look like it is _doing_ semantics, it will pass the Turing test. ____________ "To solidify one’s behavior into normative patterns involves only conforming to rules without consciously obeying them. Conforming to rules requires no conceptualization of the rules. One needs only to be conditioned to act in certain ways without being able to extract and formulate the commands that shape appropriate patterns of conduct. Pattern-conforming behavior can be seen as a truncated version of rule-governed behavior. Following rules entails conforming to patterns; both exhibit patterns, but rule- governed behavior involves more. Unlike pattern-governed behavior, it involves rules of inference (that can be seen as positions in the corresponding metagame) that carry the agent from one position to another. In Sellars’ words, “rule obeying behavior contains, in some sense, both a game and a metagame, the latter being the game in which belong the rules obeyed in playing the former game as a piece of rule obeying behavior” (Sellars, 209). For example, a pattern-governed creature would move from “it is raining” to “the ground is wet” directly, whereas a rule-governed creature would bridge the two linguistic positions with the inferential rule, “whenever and wherever it rains, the ground is wet.” To consistently move from one position to another in accordance with rules of the language game, without being able to give reasons, is sufficient qualification for the agent as a player of the language game. A chess player’s inability to formulate the rules of chess, so long as he consistently makes correct moves, is no reason to disqualify him as a player of the game." Lu paper on Sellars reflections on language games _______ [[Lorraine Daston]] Brief history of rules saved on mac computer book file:///Users/soniadejager/Downloads/Rules%20A%20Short%20History%20of%20What%20We%20Live%20By%20(Lorraine%20Daston)%20(z-lib.org).pdf ____________ ### [[Freedom]] [[Rule]]: "The concept of freedom here is different to that usually at work in improvisation: rather than a spontaneously available capacity to create ex nihilo, freedom is a cultural achievement that has to generate its own rules and norms, as there is no freedom without norms. Nor is there any way to understand the human without any form of determination." (pp. 28-9 [[Social Dissonance]], [[Mattin]]) ____________ ### Sellars on rules The linguistic meaning of a word is entirely determined by the rules of its use (Sellars, obviously after Wittgenstein) Sellars considers conceptual activity, analogical conception of thought in EPM, conceptual activity is analogous to other meaningful semantic activity, semantic significance as a mode of contentful conceptual episodes. "Conceptual role semantics," maybe also called "normative functionalism" Luca Corti says (in Hegel after Sellars YT talk) the equivalence is controversial ### Sellars on Kant: Sonia against meaning as use: Sometimes says ding and sich an appearance is difference between manifest and scientific image. Role in reasoning rather than their origin in experience. Sellars says Kant's revolutionary move was to see [[Category]]es as concepts of functional roles in mental activity. This is also what Brandom talks about the normative turn in philosophy. 1970 John Findlay + Hartman were trying to free Hegel of metaphysics and interpret him as a category theorist. Pinkard synthethized the non-metaphysicsl Hegel, and conceptual role semantics, using famous sellarsian examples of chess, etc. "Conceptual meaning determined by its move, its logic." (Pinkard). Then [[Robert Pippin]] (who also studied under Sellars) "Hegel is following Kant in saying that to understand a concept means to understand how to use it" (thus is precisely what I will argue against, about AI as absolutely underdetermined, in Metaphor paper). _____ The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, And: [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quipu](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quipu) History of tally sticks History of mathematics ________ [[Language]] as a game, or [[Rule]], the inherent [[Fun]], and the [[Risk]] in light of the vantage point or [[Perspective]], [[Directionality]], [[Vector]] “To make fun of writing but also to make fun with it: an art which implies knowing 'what can be done with language as such' (EH, 'Why I Write Such Excellent Books', 4) … Yet despite this subversion of language one still runs the risk of being understood, of being heard, misheard, translated into another language: the game of writing, for Nietzsche, remains subordinate to a new art of interpreting the world, the communication of a new perspective. … by attracting [new followers] on to 'new secret paths and dancing places' (BT, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', 3). But how is it possible to communicate 'personal' views using a language which, despite the displacements to which it is subjected, remains common and vulgarizing? Without 'speaking badly', how can one express a [[Dionysus]] who speaks a language totally different to that of [[Schopenhauer]] or [[Kant]]? … Is it not rather a way of acknowledging the specificity of philosophy, its irreducibility to any other form of expression—even if this philosophy no longer has anything traditional about it, even if it is unheard-of and insolent philosophy? A philosophy which, by combining all the 'genres' in its writing, deletes all oppositions with one great burst of laughter.” (p. 3-5) _______ [[Learning]], [[Rule]] "By many a trail and manner I came to my truth; not on one ladder did I climb to my height, where my eye roams out into my distance. And I never liked asking the way – that always offended my taste! I preferred to question and try the ways myself. All my coming and going was a trying and questioning – and truly, one must also learn to answer such questioning! That, however – is my taste: – not good, not bad, but my taste, of which I am no longer shameful nor secretive. “This – it turns out – is my way – where is yours?” – That is how I ans- wered those who asked me “the way.” The way after all – it does not exist!" "The Spirit of Gravity" p. 156, [[Nietzsche]], [[Thus Spoke Zarathustra]]. [[Rule]], [[Free will]] Intro twilight, ecce homo: ![[Sarah Kofman3.png|500]] ![[Sarah Kofman4.png|500]]