**Links to**: [[Reference]], [[Esto es un verso]], [[THIS LIE IS A SENTENCE]], [[Double consciousness]], [[Paradox]], [[Lying]], [[Mathematics]], [[Recursivity]], [[Gödel]], [[Self-evidence]], [[Self-model]], [[Self]], [[Selfæta]], [[Self-deception]], [[Self-refuting idea]], [[Self-interest]]. ### [[Postulate]]: Equivalence and difference are sometimes (_often_) more useful principles than truth and falsity. See also: [[04 Concepts as pre-dictions]]. %% INSERT HERE PRESENTATION sint lucas but adapted ### Negation ### Affirmation ### Equivalence ### Difference What is negation? If something is true, the negation of that is false and vice verse True and false are exclusive and exhaustive But in dialethism truth and false overlap and underlap, look into logical gaps and gluts #lookinto — overlap and underlap in contradictions show how we can have something be false but that does not imply that it is not true Question becomes: the principle of the excluded middle does not apply where the future is not yet determined (claims about the future, says Aristotle in _de interpretatione_, are not determined until the case happens) How do we make sense of this bit of Aristotle when he actually subscribes to the excluded middle? Priest says that we should consider the view of the open future. #lookinto Priest says we do not necessarily have to subscribe to the open future, but we definitely need to accept that considering these things gets us into the metaphysics of time, unavoidably. Orthodox logic assumes that all names refer to something, that they all point, e.g. Russell favors the idea that the bald king of France is false because he just does not exist Frege earlier, on the other hand, says it is neither. These things can refer, but they refer to nonexistent objects. For example: concepts. Priest says “Paris is in France, but my idea of Paris is not in France” — the idea of it is one thing and the assumed referent is another. This inevitably brings us to metaphysics, realism versus idealism. A contradiction can be paradoxical in different ways. True and false, true and not true, etc. All of this depends on how we define and handle truth, #Zf which is how we handle equivalence: What i am saying is not true versus esto es un verso. The reference changes: If we want to talk about “truth” we cannot get around true as a predicate. We cannot get around truth. But truth depends on context, and that’s as far as we care to make a statement about truth. ### Self-reference and regress Contradiction being a problem This sentence is not true (is false) This sentence is not true (is true) This sentence is true = solved, but why? Contradiction not being a problem This sentence is not true (is true and false) This sentence is not true (is false and not true) This sentence is not true (is not false and true) Regress is a problem because it explodes _time_ (see also the options presented by Frege, Kripke, Turing) The time it takes to check whether a, b or c (is this person lying? Does the thing I left under this stone remain there? Will I get that job? Etc.) is an everyday experience which comes to an end by constraints expressed beyond our capacities. To desire more is to desire immortality and a way to deal with spacetime we do not yet comprehend. Negintelligibility. There are proposals, e.g. computational irreducibility (or earlier: Zeno’s paradoxes, the contemplation of infinity). ### Computational irreducibility ### Extended paradoxes or revenge problems “This sentence is either false or bad” — contradiction if it’s true, false if it’s ### Existence Quine on what there is: the arguments are poor, according to Priest Priest is a non-ist: there are things that do not exist, that’s ok But he says nonexistent objects are things like Sherlock Holmes But #Zf says: then we need to subscribe to a sort of non-materialism paired w/ a materialism of “objects” Out there. Everything exists: also apparently “fictional” Things, which are not fictional at all, since they appear: they are there, they can be talked about. They are pattern-structures which reveal logics other than those of say, a chair in front of you, but that chair in front of you is just as fictional as Sherlock Holmes if it is not there now and you have to imagine it. The concept of SH is just as constructed as the idea of a chair. Severio and Heidegger both think that as long as you can think of it, exists. But priest says that ok sure but when you speak of nothingness that is something else. In rerun natura severing #lookinto ### Extra random notes Priest says nothing _is_ and is _not_ an object at the same time I say: nothing is only an object when it needs to be speakable, otherwise it is everywhere, it is the strongest constraint (see dark energy and matter otherwise) Negintelligibility is the ultimate nothingness Jason sudowski media Could this lead to a schematization/typology of how hyperphantastics "picture" conceptuality, a space of abstractions, and how aphantastics conceptualize (or directly perceive, e.g., visually) complex visual situations? Do aphantastics abstract "speedily" into the future (concepts apply infinitely: no grue/bleen spatiotemporal ambiguities possible) and hyperphantastics "hold", p-adically, grue/bleen for everything, all the time; implying a different type of spatiotemporality, or conception of infinity? Aphantasia: clear (conceptual) distances, hyperphantasia: possible the absence of distance? Aphantastics are avid exploiters and hyperphantastics are avid explorers?