**Links to**: [[Esto es un verso]], [[◉ G E I S T ◉/◉ G E I S T ◉/Memory]], [[Self-reference]], [[Generalization]], [[Abstraction]]. >_[[THIS LIE IS A SENTENCE]]_, Z. Fork, 2023. First order, no paradox (except we are binding a lie, somehow): ∃ x ( L i e ( x ) ∧ S e n t e n c e ( x ) ) (I.e., there exists an ( x ) such that ( x ) is a lie and ( x ) is a sentence). Predicate, paradox: S ( This lie ) ↔ ¬ S ( This lie ) (I.e., this lie is a sentence if and only if this lie is not a sentence, **because it is a lie = false**). But the self-referentiality of pointing at falsity before pointing at the sentence, the thing supposed to be at odds with itself, is what conduces to something more complex than in the case of “this sentence is a lie”. This is where episodic and semantic memory get real, mixed up. %% If we take “this lie is a sentence” as a set theoretic statement, we get the same contradiction as we get when we express “this sentence is a lie”, but this is where we can question the notion of set with respect to how it reflects properties or aspects of the world. A lie being a sociosemantic concept (which is _different_ from a sentence: P and not P flatten the distinction), we can perhaps better think of constructive types rather than foundational sets, and consider prediction estimations, or evidence through active inference with negation as a hyperprior, as the way through which we perceive, socialize and coordinate thought. This certainly makes sense in the context of thought naturalized as active inference, however, it also makes sense if we consider early logic gates: the first ever OR-gate was only possible by thinking an additional connection which would ensure circuit-continuity. In this case: reality is gradually constructed, grounded and evidenced. So, better rely on type Theory to count as evidence the falsity of something not being the case when we categorize it as a lie. So we decide what the what group of things is rather than specify the set by it being the mere property of falsehood. This also relates a little bit to how borges did reconceptualization of categorization, towards type theoretic understandings of groups rather than set theoretic foundations